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NOTES
BUILDING UPON
THE ARCHITECTURAL WORKS PROTECTION
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1990
VANESSA N. SCAGLIONE
INTRODUCTION
The Architectural Works Protection Copyright Act of 1990 ("Archi-
tectural Copyright Act" or "Act") grants copyright protection to designs
embodied in actual works of architecture.2 In essence, the Act creates a
new category of protectible subject matter for architectural works,3 al-
lowing an architect to sue for infringement when a subsequent building is
copied from his or her copyrighted building.4
Congress passed the Architectural Copyright Act to comply with the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works5
("Berne Convention") with respect to works of architecture.6 The
United States' adherence to the Berne Convention signified its alignment
"with other developed and developing nations in subscribing to the
world's oldest and most extensive [copyright] treaty."7 The Berne Con-
vention includes works of architecture as protected subject matter under
a broad category of literary and artistic works.8 Thus, for the United
States to comply with the Berne Convention, it was necessary to forego
United States tradition and grant architectural works outright copy-
1. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
2. The Act protects the design of the building rather than the building itself. See
infra note 21 and accompanying text. As the United States Copyright Office has stated,
"[T]he protection of architectural works under copyright is fundamentally not about the
protection of buildings per se; it is... about the protection of perceptible personal expres-
sion embodied in some, but not all, buildings." United States Copyright Office, A Report
of the Register of Copyrights: Copyright in Works of Architecture 157 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Copyright Report].
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. 11 1990). Protection for the constructed building is
distinct from protection for plans, models, and specific sculptural features of a building.
See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (detailing copyright in architecture).
4. The Act applies equally to all persons designing architectural works and not just
to architects. See H.R. Rep. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 n.36 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6949 n.36 [hereinafter H.R. 735]. For the sake of simplicity,
this Note uses the term "architect" to encompass all designers of architectural works.
5. Sept. 9, 1886, revised in Paris on July 24, 1971, 828 U.N.T.S. 221.
6. See H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 4, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6935. For a
description of the Berne Convention, see World Intellectual Property Org., Guide to the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1978); Jane C.
Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later. The U.S Joins the
Berne Convention, 13 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 1, 8-24 (1988).
7. Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 6, at 1.
8. See Berne Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.1.
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right.9 Prior to the Architectural Copyright Act, American copyright
law did not protect architecture per se,10 although monumental architec-
ture1 and certain works related to architecture were protected.' 2
9. See Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 221; see generally Laura E. Steinfeld, The
Berne Convention and Protection of Works ofArchitecture: Why the United States Should
Create a New Subject Matter Category for Works of Architecture Under Section 102(a) of
the Copyright Act of 1976, 24 Ind. L. Rev. 459 (1991) (arguing that protection of architec-
tural works was necessary under Berne); Natalie Wargo, Copyright Protection for Archi-
tecture and the Berne Convention, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 403 (1990) (same).
Throughout the various acts of Congress, architectural works never received outright
copyright protection. Thus, because architectural works did not constitute their own
category of protected subject matter, the only recourse for an architect was to seek pro-
tection for his work under the category of "pictorial, graphic, or sculptural" works. See
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists
Rights Acts and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 Colum.-
VLA J.L. & Arts 477, 490 (1990). A building's overall shape, however, was specifically
denied protection under this category. See H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668 [hereinafter H.R. 1476]; see also
Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 202-04, 218-19 (explaining this lack of protection).
Moreover, the 1976 Copyright Act did not protect useful articles. See Pub. L. No. 94-
553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (as codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101) (defining "pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural" works). Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a "useful article" as an
article "having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appear-
ance of the article or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988); see also 1 Melville
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18[A]-[D], at 2-195 to 2-207 (1978) (explaining ra-
tionale for denying protection to useful articles). Because most structures provide shelter,
they are technically utilitarian and were not eligible for copyright protection under the
1976 Copyright Act. Thus, buildings were only protected under the category of "picto-
rial, graphic, and sculptural" works to the extent that they included features that were
separable from the building's utility. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 113 (1988); Ginsburg, supra,
at 490-91; see also infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing protection of
monumental works).
10. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at OV-1 to OV-7 (giving a brief history of copyright
law and the present acts of Congress that legislate copyright).
11. Monumental architecture has been defined as "works which society at large re-
gards as artistic statements, [and] with such a self-evident, unmistakable stamp of artistic
individuality that the useful features of the structure are fundamentally tertiary to the
real nature of the work." Copyright Report, supra note 2, at iv.
12. Works "related to" architecture-including architectural plans, drawings, and
sketches-were protected under the 1976 Copyright Act. See Pub. L. No. 100-568,
§ 4(a)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 2853, 2854 (1988) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101) (technical draw-
ings, which also include architectural drawings, are included under the protected cate-
gory of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works"); see also Imperial Homes Corp. v.
Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1972) (recognizing plans as protected works);
Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 260-61
(D. Neb. 1982) (same); David E. Shipley, Copyright Protection for Architectural Works,
37 S.C. L. Rev. 393, 394-417 (1986) (detailing history on copyright law relating to archi-
tecture prior to the Act). Moreover, when a structure incorporated decorative ornamen-
tation separable from its utilitarian aspects, these elements were also protected as
pictorial or sculptural works. See H.R. 1476, supra note 9, at 14, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5627; see also Nimmer, supra note 9, at OV-1 to OV-7 (for a brief his-
tory of copyright law and the present acts of Congress that legislate copyright). An ex-
ample of a separate artistic work on a building is a gargoyle on a cornice or a mural on a
ceiling.
Following the statutory history, courts had historically agreed that building a subse-
quent, identical building was not copyright infringement if based on visual inspection of
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Prior to the Architectural Copyright Act, Congress attempted to com-
ply with the Berne Convention via the Berne Implementation Act of
1988.11 While this legislation expressly provided protection for architec-
tural plans and models as "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," it
nevertheless omitted protection for completed architectural structures. 4
To compensate for this lack of protection, Congress commissioned the
Copyright Office to review the current scope of copyright protection for
architectural works."5 The Copyright Office determined that "U.S. law
may well prove inadequate to fulfill the requirements of the Berne Con-
vention," and suggested alternatives to comply with the Berne Conven-
tion.16 Based on these recommendations, Congress enacted the
Architectural Copyright Act.
Despite the Act's good intentions, it provides inadequate guidance for
determining exactly which architectural works should be protected.
While the legislative history might have provided some basis for filling in
this gap, it in fact created further confusion."' Three major problems
another building, rather than on copyrighted drawings. See Robert R. Jones Assocs. v.
Nino Homes, 858 F.2d 274, 280 (6th Cir. 1988); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. Supp.
658, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); DeSilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184, 196
(M.D. Fla. 1962); cf Associated Hosts, Inc. v. Moss, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 973, 975-76
(W.D.N.C. 1979) (enjoining defendant from copying plaintiff's drawings although there
was no evidence that defendant had access to the drawings). Courts had also agreed that
copying copyrighted drawings did constitute infringement. See Demetriades, 680 F.
Supp. at 666; Ga-On Homes, Inc. v. Spitzer Homes, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183, 186
(M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 685 (5th Cir. 1974). An architect, there-
fore, was protected from the unauthorized use or duplication of her copyrighted drawings
but not from the building of a subsequent, identical building based on a visual inspection
of her structure. This inconsistency, although rare, did not make any sense considering
that an architect is harmed more by the construction of another building identical to her
own than by the simple copying of her plans. See Shipley, supra, at 401-02.
13. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.);
see generally Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 6, at 8-24 (describing the impact of the
Berne Implementation Act on American copyright law).
14. See Berne Implementation Act § 4(a), 102 Stat. at 2855.
15. See Letter from Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman of Subcommittee of Courts,
Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, to Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights
(Apr. 27, 1988), in Copyright Report, supra note 2, app. A.
16. Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 223-26. The four alternatives prepared by the
Copyright Office were that Congress could (1) create a new subject matter category for
architectural works; (2) amend the 1976 Copyright Act to provide the copyright owner of
architectural plans the right to prohibit unauthorized construction of substantially simi-
lar buildings based on those plans; (3) amend the definition of "useful article" under the
1976 Copyright Act to exclude "unique" (i.e. single copy) architectural structures; and
(4) allow the courts to develop new legal theories of protection for architectural works.
See id.
17. The Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of
Justice methodically explains each provision of the Act. See H.R. 735, supra note 4, at
17-25, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6948-56. One example of the confusion is
whether the Act is meant solely to comply with Berne. Compare id. at 12, reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6943 ("The importance of H.R. 3990 [the bill on which the Act is
based] ... should not be measured solely by the purpose of placing the United States
unequivocally in compliance with its Berne Convention obligations.") with id. at 20, re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951 ("The sole purpose of legislating at this time is to
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exist with the Act and its legislative history. First, the legislative his-
tory's definition of what is protected under the Act is too restrictive and
may exclude works deserving architectural protection. Second, the legis-
lative history's equivocal wording leads to confusion as to whether archi-
tectural works can receive dual protection as both sculptural and
architectural works. Finally, the Act's legislative history proposes a
"functionality test" to determine what aspects of a constructed architec-
tural work are protected. Under this test, if design elements are deter-
mined by functional considerations, they are not copyrightable.' 8 Hence,
the functionality test could exclude most architectural works from pro-
tection if it is interpreted narrowly or restrictively.
The Architectural Copyright Act should be construed by courts to en-
sure full copyright protection for architectural works. By interpreting
the Act broadly, courts will carry out the dual constitutional goals of
protecting the works of an author and "promot[ing] the Progress of Sci-
ence,"'19 and the congressional goal of "stimulat[ing] excellence in design,
thereby enriching [the] public environment."20 This Note attempts to
provide the clarification of the Act necessary to protect all architectural
works deserving protection.
Part I of this Note examines the Architectural Copyright Act's defini-
tion of "architectural works," focusing particularly on what this category
includes and arguing that a broad interpretation of architectural works
will most effectively carry out copyright goals. Part II addresses the is-
sue of dual protection for works that fall under the categories of both
sculpture and architectural works. This Part concludes that, in appropri-
ate circumstances, architectural works need to be protected as both
sculptural and architectural works. Part III outlines the application of
the "functionality test" developed by the Act's corresponding legislative
history and examines in detail the problems inherent in applying this test
to architecture. Part III also asserts that in order to grant effective copy-
right protection to architecture, the functionality test should be replaced
with a more lenient standard to determine a building's copyrightability.
This Note offers the following standard for determining when an archi-
tectural work and its features should be protected: (1) when the work
meets or exceeds a minimal level of creativity; (2) when the work to be
protected does not implement a method or process of construction; and
(3) when, even if the work does implement a method or process, other
place the United States unequivocally in compliance with its Berne Convention
obligations.").
18. See id. at 20-21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951-52; see also infra notes
71-74 and accompanying text (discussing functionality).
19. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
20. H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6944. Other
forms of intellectual property do not adequately protect architectural works, and their
possible applications to architecture are beyond the scope of this Note. See Copyright
Report, supra note 2, at 63-69 (discussing other forms of legal protection for architectural
works and their inadequacies).
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reasonable alternatives could have been used. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that a broad interpretation of the Architectural Copyright Act is
essential to ensure copyright protection for architectural works.
I. WHAT IS PROTECTED UNDER
THE ARCHITECTURAL COPYRIGHT ACT
A. Defining "Building"
The Architectural Copyright Act and its legislative history suggest
starting points for determining exactly what works are included as archi-
tectural works. Under the Act, an architectural work is defined as the
"design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression,
including a building, architectural plans, or drawings. The work in-
cludes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of
spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual stan-
dard features."2
Recognizing the difficulty in using the term "building," the legislative
history attempts to refine the definition of architectural works.22 It states
that "[o]bviously, the term [building] encompasse[s] habitable structures
such as houses and office buildings. It also covers structures that are
used, but not inhabited, by human beings, such as churches, pergolas,
gazebos, and garden pavilions." 23 Thus, according to legislative history,
if the structure is meant to be inhabited by a human being, even tempo-
rarily, as in the case of a gazebo, it is a building and therefore qualifies as
a copyrightable architectural work.
The legislative history, however, does not resolve all ambiguities.24
Specifically, the history restricts the definition of "building" to exclude
"bridges and related nonhabitable three-dimensional structures" from
protection.' This exclusion raises two major questions: (1) is this dis-
tinction necessary; and (2) if so, how can an architect know whether his
or her work will be categorized as a protected architectural work or as a
nonprotected "nonhabitable three-dimensional structure"?
B. Protecting Nonhabitable Structures
Excluding "nonhabitable three-dimensional structures" from the Act
poses problems for architectural works that blur the line between archi-
21. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act § 702(a), 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp.
111990) (emphasis added). The Act, therefore, seeks to protect an architect's design as it
is embodied in a built structure. See H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 18, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6949 ("The protected work in [sic] the design of the building.").
22. See H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951 (raising
the question of "what is meant by the term 'building' ").
23. Ia
24. See id at 19-20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6950-51.
25. Id at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951. Because the Berne Convention
does not require the protection of these structures, Congress deferred the question of their
copyrightability to "another day." See id
1992]
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tecture and nonhabitable three-dimensional structures. For example, the
bridge-like sculpture mimicking the Statue of Liberty's crown in Battery
Park City in Manhattan,26 fits both definitions. It is habitable like a per-
gola or gazebo and therefore is a building under the Act's legislative his-
tory; at the same time, it is a lookout and therefore probably qualifies as a
nonhabitable three-dimensional structure that would not receive protec-
tion under the legislative history.27
The follies2" in the Parc de la Villette in Paris provide additional exam-
ples of structures that blur the line between architecture and
nonhabitable three-dimensional works. Although some of the follies are
easily defined as buildings because of the functions that they house-for
example, a restaurant and a visitors' center-others, such as the belve-
dere folly,29 serve no utilitarian function. Under the legislative history's
guidelines, it is impossible to determine whether this latter structure
would qualify as architecture, sculpture, or nonhabitable structure.30
Finally, many bridges are monumental and deserve as much protection
26. The steel sculpture is essentially a semi-circular staircase with a lookout. A trellis
above echoes the Statue of Liberty's crown. For a more detailed description and photo-
graph of the lookout, see Nancy Princenthal, In the Waterfront, Village Voice, June 7,
1988, at 99.
27. See id. (describing the work as part of a collaboration between an artist, an archi-
tect, and a landscape architect to include public art in Battery Park City).
28. A folly is an "extravagant picturesque building erected to suit a fanciful taste."
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 480 (9th ed. 1990).
29. See Ziva Freiman, A Non-Unified Field Theory, Progressive Architecture, Nov.
1989, at 65-73 (including a photograph of the belvedere folly and descriptions of most of
the other follies).
30. The problem of distinguishing architecture from nonhabitable three-dimensional
structures is analogous to distinguishing sculpture from utilitarian articles. This problem
was raised in a Ninth Circuit case, Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
In Poe, an artist sought damages for copyright infringement of an article that looked like
a swimsuit, but that he called an "artwork." See 745 F.2d at 1239. The court held that
there was a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the article was a work of art
which is protected, or a utilitarian article of clothing which is not protected. See Id. at
1243. Under the rationale of this case, a designer might escape the prohibition of protect-
ing nonhabitable three-dimensional structures by calling his work "architecture" or
"sculpture." See Shipley, supra note 12, at 424-25 (applying this argument to utilitarian
artwork). This argument, however, would be successful only in cases where no evidence
existed that the work had a utilitarian function. See id. This, in turn, could lead to
subjective determinations of what classifies as utilitarian. For example, if the defendant
in Poe had shown that the plaintiff's work could be worn, the plaintiff may have lost his
case even though he clearly intended to create a work of art rather than a swimsuit. A
different judge, however, may not have been persuaded that use as a bathing suit was an
intrinsic function of the artwork.
The problems with this type of analysis were also raised in Brandir International, Inc.
v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). In this case, a bicycle rack
designer sought damages for copyright infringement. The court held for the defendant,
stating that the rack was not entitled to copyright protection because its form was influ-
enced by functional concerns. See id. at 1147. The artist's subjective intent in his design
thus became relevant. As in Poe, an architect citing Brandir could simply state that he
intended to design an architectural work rather than an excluded three-dimensional
structure. Such a result is untenable because, as one judge stated in Brandir's dissent, the
"focus on the process or sequence followed by the particular designer makes copyright
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as buildings. For example, architects recognize the Golden Gate Bridge
and the Bay Bridge in California as valuable works of architectural de-
sign.31 The legislative history, however, specifically precludes the protec-
tion of bridges under the Architectural Copyright Act.32 This result
defies both logic and the legitimate expectations of architects. Put sim-
ply, these works should be given copyright protection under the Act be-
cause the legislative history creates an inappropriate distinction between
architectural works and nonhabitable, three-dimensional structures.3
C. Expanding the Definition of "Building"
Unlike the legislative history, the Architectural Copyright Act does
not automatically exclude nonhabitable three-dimensional structures
from protection because it never defines the term "building" in the stat-
ute itself.34 Thus, courts should grant protection to these works and
place less emphasis on the legislative history.
In passing the Act, Congress had originally sought to protect "archi-
tectural works embodied in innovative structures that defy easy classifi-
cation."' 35 Congress was concerned, however, that the phrase would also
encompass, among other things, cloverleafs, dams, and interstate high-
way bridges, 36 and the legislative history seems to reflect this concern in
its restrictive language. This concern, however, is largely unfounded.
First, most cloverleafs, dams, and highway bridges are owned by the gov-
ernment and therefore are automatically excluded from copyright protec-
tion.3 7 Second, many works that are not governmentally-owned also are
excluded because protection only extends to works involving creativity.
Architects will still be able to copy those structures that are purely func-
tional. Finally, the difficulty of proving infringement will circumscribe
an architect's ability to effectively protect purely functional structures.
protection depend upon largely fortuitous circumstances concerning the creation of the
design in issue." Id at 1151 (Winter, J., dissenting).
31. Both the Golden Gate Bridge and the Bay Bridge had consulting architects in-
volved in their designs. They have been praised for their design excellence in architecturejournals. See Michael J. Crosbie, The Background of the Bridges, Architecture, Mar.
1985, at 150.
32. See H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951. A
complete discussion of the copyrightability of structures such as bridges is beyond the
scope of this Note and is part of the larger question of the copyrightability of industrial
design. See generally Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Sug-
gested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 707 (1983) (discussing
copyright protection for industrial designs). This Note only points out the deficiencies in
the Act and the possible unfairness in its application.
33. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
35. H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 19-20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6950-51.
36. See id at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951.
37. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1988) (copyright protection unavailable for works of the
United States Government). Although many of these works may be state-owned, they
can also be excluded from protection for other reasons. See infra notes 38-48 and accom-
panying text.
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
As one commentator has noted, "In those rare cases where function
alone is determinative, a monopoly would be avoided by the inherent
difficulty in proving that the claimant's design had been copied rather
than independently conceived." 38 Therefore, structures such as bridges
and dams will not be protected unless they embody highly unique and
exceptional designs.
The difficulty of proving infringement would prevent copyright mo-
nopolies on shapes dictated by consumer preference,3 9 thereby omitting
mundane structures, such as typical highway overpasses, from copyright
protection. Furthermore, "the risk of granting a monopoly on basic de-
signs by extending copyright protection to architectural works is circum-
vented in [other] countries by the fact that 'it is naturally more difficult
to prove infringement of copyright in a plain building than in one show-
ing marked originality.' "" The issue of infringement may also be com-
pletely avoided: Basic shapes are part of the public domain and therefore
ineligible for copyright protection in the first place.4
Infringement also requires a finding of substantial similarity between
the works. As one court has stated, "A general impression of similarity
in design is not enough to make out an infringement case."42 The fact
that a structure is copyrighted does not mean that a similar structure will
be found to be an infringement. In addition, courts should allow "sub-
stantial latitude ... [to subsequent architects] so that they can modify
and perhaps improve upon unprotectible architectural styles, ideas, and
concepts."43 Therefore, an expansive definition of "building" will not
permit the original architect to have a monopoly on a universal design or
diminish the creativity of other architects.
Courts are fully able to distinguish between protecting expression and
protecting ideas, processes, or methods, and can apply this to architec-
ture. For example, in one case, a plaintiff sought damages from defend-
ants who allegedly copied the plaintiff's design of a structure built for the
World's Fair.' In dictum, the court stated that the plaintiff could not
copyright his idea of a tower with a spherical building on the top of it.45
The court, recognizing that the use of towers was not unique and that the
38. Erika White, Standing on Shaky Ground: Copyright Protection for Works of Ar-
chitecture, 6 Art & the Law 70, 71 (1981) (suggesting that using the separability test to
discriminate against modem, streamlined works is unnecessary to achieve copyright's
goals).
39. See id.
40. Id. (quoting F.E. Skone James, Copinger on the Law of Copyright 256 (9th ed.
1958)).
41. See id.
42. Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 154, 155 (E.D.
Tenn. 1983), aff'd, 739 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1984).
43. Shipley, supra note 12, at 447.
44. See Wickham, 555 F. Supp. at 154.
45. See id. at 156; see also Shipley, supra note 12, at 446 ("[S]imilarities resulting from
the fact that both structures are based on the same general concept ... will not provide
the basis for a successful [infringement] claim.").
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form of the defendant's structure was completely dictated by functional
requirements,4" implied that this too would prevent the success of plain-
tiff's infringement claim. Yet the design of a structure like the Golden
Gate Bridge transcends the functional requirements of a bridge and de-
serves to be copyrighted.
Another example of how courts protect designs rather than ideas in
architectural works involved a plaintiff who alleged that the defendant
had infringed on his copyrighted bridge approach.4' The court held that,
because the second bridge was independently conceived, the infringement
claim could not be sustained.48 Moreover, the court stated in dictum
that, even if the defendant had copied the plaintiff's plans, the plaintiff
would have no cause of action because he could not copyright his system
of traffic control.49 Copyrighting a structure such as the Bay Bridge
would extend only to its creative aspects and not to a new construction
method.
Along these lines, someone trying to protect a highway bridge, canal,
or dam is unlikely to win an infringement case because it would be diffi-
cult for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant did not conceive the
design on his own. Additionally, the design may be considered to be a
system. Either way, proving infringement is difficult in structures with
little creativity, and courts should allow a broad definition of "building."
Such a broad definition would protect most architectural works, and
would therefore carry out the constitutional and congressional goals of
encouraging creativity, enhancing the environment, and benefitting the
public.50 Moreover, a broad definition of building would not hinder
other architects' creative expressions by creating a monopoly over com-
monplace architectural ideas. 1
II. DUAL IDENTITY:
WORKs THAT ARE BOTH SCULPTURE AND ARCHITECTURE
Prior to the Act, three-dimensional models and nonfunctional monu-
mental works of architecture were protected as sculptural works.52 This
is because these works served as artistic statements rather than as shel-
ters.53 The Washington Monument, for example, is a nonfunctional,
monumental, architectural work that could have been protected as a
46. See Wickhram, 555 F. Supp. at 156.
47. See Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
48. See id at 299.
49. See iL at 299-300.
50. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
51. See H.R. 735,supra note 4, at 18, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6949; see also
Denicola, supra note 32, at 718-23 (explaining the rationale behind limiting copyright
protection in useful articles).
52. See Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, 16 F. Supp. 729, 731-32 (M.D. Pa. 1936);
Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 220; see also supra note 12 and accompanying text
(ornamentation on a building could also be protected as a separate sculptural work).
53. See Copyright Report, supra note 2, at iv.
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sculptural work,54 while the United States Capitol Building would not
have been protected because of its function as an office building. One
could also argue that the Washington Monument is functional as a look-
out. However, its aesthetic qualities are conceptually, and perhaps physi-
cally, separable and therefore copyrightable. Even under this view, the
Capitol Building would remain unprotected because its function is not
conceptually separable from its aesthetic qualities.
Under the Architectural Copyright Act, however, both of these struc-
tures receive copyright protection as architectural works. The Act does
not state, however, whether monumental works, such as the Washington
Monument, are exclusively protected as architectural works, or whether
such structures can also receive protection as sculptural works. This
question is important because sculptural works receive more protection
than architectural works in several respects. First, sculptural works are
protected from the making of two-dimensional copies." Thus, an unli-
censed commercial photograph of a sculpture qualifies as infringement
while a commercial photograph of a building does not. 6 In addition,
sculptural works fall under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990,1"
which protects, among other things, the "moral" rights of the artist.5
8
The legislative history seems to suggest that nonfunctional, architec-
tural works should receive dual protection.59 Nevertheless, the history's
wording is confusing and at least one commentator has interpreted it as
denying dual protection to a work as both architecture and sculpture. 60
Resolution of this issue is essential to ensure uniform protection to artists
and architects.
A. Architecture as Sculpture
The Architectural Copyright Act itself does not explicitly prohibit art-
ists from seeking protection for their works under the categories of both
architectural works61 and sculptural works. 62 In fact, although the
wording in the history is confusing, Congress seems to have intended
sculptural architectural works to be protected under both categories.
The history states: "Monumental, nonfunctional works of architecture
are currently protected under section 102(a)(5) of title 17 as sculptural
54. See Shipley, supra note 12, at 425; White, supra note 38, at 71.
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 113 (1988).
56. See Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 494-95.
57. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.); see also Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 477-90 (discussing the Visual Artists Rights
Act).
58. Moral rights are the artist's personal, noneconomic rights that include claiming
authorship and preventing destruction or alteration of his work. See Ginsburg, supra
note 9, at 478.
59. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
60. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (Supp. 11 1990).
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
[Vol. 61
ARCHITECTURAL COPYRIGHT
works. These works are, nevertheless, architectural works, and as such,
will not be protected exclusively under section 102(a)(8)."63
By analogy, the Act's legislative history allows architectural plans and
drawings to be protected both as architectural works and as pictorial
works, stating that "[a]n individual creating an architectural work by
depicting that work in plans or drawing [sic] will have two separate copy-
rights, one in the architectural work.., the other in the plans or draw-
ings." Congress was thus not averse to allowing an architect to have
this dual protection for his work, and logically this permissiveness can be
carried over to allow an architect to protect a work as both sculpture and
architecture. Moreover, even if this reading of the legislative history is
rejected, it is important to note that the statute itself does not prohibit
dual protection. Thus, as some scholars, including Justice Scalia, have
argued, the legislative history need not even be considered, and the plain
meaning of the statute should be followed.65
In opposition, Ginsburg suggests that Congress did not intend to grant
dual protection to architectural works. Thus, she writes that the legisla-
tive history's footnote states that, "'[t]hese works are, nevertheless, ar-
chitectural works, and, as such will no[w] be protected exclusively under
section 102(a)(8).' "66 This is significant, of course, because pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works receive more protection than architectural
works,6 7 and Ginsburg's interpretation would deny this additional
protection.
As Ginsburg herself states, this reading is "problematic" because "[ilt
fails to elucidate what constitutes a 'nonfunctional work of architecture,'
as opposed to a 'sculptural work.' "68 Furthermore, characterizing cer-
tain structures as "buildings," and therefore architecture, would discrim-
inate against certain artists. For example, Alice Aycock and Ned Smyth
create room-size pieces that include architectural elements such as stairs
and columns.6 9 Human beings can inhabit their pieces as one might in-
63. H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 20 n.43, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951 n.43
(emphasis added). Congress was aware that certain architectural works could be consid-
ered sculptural works. Thus, in the Act's legislative history, Congress denied election of
protection only in instances where the designer of a sculptural work embodied in an
architectural work is different from the architect. See icL at 19, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6950.
64. Id.
65. See, eg., Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 69 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing
the majority's reliance on the Congressional Record and referring to the majority's debate
on whether to adopt the Committee Reports as "demeaning and unproductive"); Sullivan
v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the use of
subsequent legislative history).
66. Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 495 n.72 (quoting H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 20 n.43,
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951 n.43 (emphasis added)).
67. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing higher degree of protection
for sculptural works).
68. Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 495 n.72.
69. See Phil Patton, New Wood Sculpture, Horizon, Jan. 1980, at 51-53 (photograph
and description of Aycock's "The Central Machine"); Nancy Princenthal, On the Water-
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habit a pergola. Anyone initially viewing Aycock's and Smyth's work
would likely consider them to be sculptures rather than architecture.
Yet, under the legislative history's definition of architecture, the work
could qualify as architecture and, under Ginsburg's formulation, would
receive less copyright protection than that of other artists.
Ginsburg's interpretation undoubtedly poses problems for artists and
architects who would want their works classified as sculptural works,
rather than as architectural works, in order to receive a higher degree of
copyright protection. Hoping to create works that are more likely to be
considered "art," artists are less likely to incorporate architectural ele-
ments into their works. In addition, infringers are less likely to seek an
artist's permission for using his work if they think that the work will be
classified as architecture rather than as sculpture. In short, Ginsburg's
interpretation of the Act as denying dual protection will tend to compro-
mise an artist's work or encourage infringement.
B. Granting Dual Protection to Sculptural Architecture
To ensure the full amount of protection for all artists, an artist who
creates a sculptural work of architecture should receive protection as
both an architectural work and as a sculptural work.
Allowing an artist dual protection avoids many difficulties inherent in
exclusive protection. A court will not have to make the difficult distinc-
tion between nonfunctional architecture and sculpture. Instead, an artist
who claims his work is sculpture will be treated as all other sculptors are
now: (1) the court will have to analyze whether his work qualifies as a
sculpture or as a utilitarian article; (2) if it is a utilitarian article, the
court will apply the separability test7° usually applied to useful articles
under the Copyright Act of 1976; and (3) if the court decides that the
work is utilitarian with no separable aesthetic elements, then the artist
can resort to the lesser protection of architectural works.
III. MOVING BEYOND THE FLAWED FUNCTIONALITY TEST
To determine the scope of an architectural work's copyrightability, the
Architectural Copyright Act's legislative history suggests a two-part test:
First, an architectural work should be examined to determine whether
there are original design elements present, including overall shape and
interior architecture. If such design elements are present, a second
step is reached to examine whether the design elements are function-
ally required. If the design elements are not functionally required, the
work is protectible without regard to physical or conceptual
separability. 71
front, Art in America, Apr. 1987, at 211 (photograph and description of Smyth's "The
Upper Room" in Battery Park City).
70. A separability test determines what aspects of the article are nonutilitarian and
therefore copyrightable. See infra note 74.
71. H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 20-21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951-52.
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In formulating this test, the legislature sought to avoid the use of the
"separability test," historically employed to determine the scope of
copyrightability of useful articles under the category of "pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural" work, because many commentators disagreed as
to whether and how such a test should apply to architecture.' Gener-
ally, a separability test has been used to decide which articles, especially
utilitarian articles, are copyrightable.73 If an article's intrinsic function is
its utility, then it is not protectible. If, however, an article incorporates
features that can be identified separately from its utility, these features
are protectible.74
A. Flaws in Functionality
The "functionality test" is ineffective and inappropriate. It does not
accomplish the Act's goal of avoiding the problems previously encoun-
tered in applying a separability test to architecture because functionality
is hardly distinguishable from separability." Furthermore, functionality
discriminates against certain styles of architecture, contrary to well-es-
tablished copyright goals.76
1. Functionality Equals Separability
Although the legislative history implies that functionality is not the
same as separability, in essence, applying either test to architecture pro-
duces the same result. Under functionality, "[i]f [a] design element [is]
not functionally required, [it] is protectible without regard to ... separa-
bility."7 7 Similarly, the separability test protects only those elements that
are not intertwined with the utility of an article.7 Because design ele-
ments that are not functionally required would also be conceptually or
72. See id. at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951 (considerable scholarly and
judicial disagreement over how to apply the separability test to architecture).
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
74. See id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 1476, supra note 9, at 55, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668 (explaining separability test); Denicola, supra note 32, at 711-17
(describing development of separability test regarding utilitarian objects).
Separability has been interpreted differently by many courts. Essentially, if a useful
article has elements that are either conceptually separable or physically separable from its
utility, then those elements are protected. See Alan Latman et al., Copyright for the
Nineties 197-221 (3d ed. 1989). Difficulties have arisen in the application of conceptual
separability. Compare Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993-
94 (2d Cir. 1980) (belt buckle design separable because of aesthetic aspect) with Brandir
Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987) (shape of
bicycle rack may not be protectible if the artist's design was influenced by rack's use).
75. See H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951; supra
note 74.
76. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
77. H.1 735, supra note 4, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6952.
78. See id.; see also Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418
(2d Cir. 1985) ("[S]ince the aesthetic and artistic features of the [objects] are inseparable
from the [objects'] use as utilitarian articles the [objects] are not copyrightable.").
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physically separable from the utilitarian aspects of the building,79 and
because the functionality test denies protection to functionally deter-
mined elements, 8°.the two tests are indistinguishable. In fact, many com-
mentators writing on the application of the separability test to
architecture have couched the test in terms of the building's function.8"
Thus, the functionality test is simply a separability test with another
name. Its application, therefore, will result in many of the same
problems that arise in applying a separability test to architecture.
Since the functionality test is really a separability test, analyzing sepa-
rability in architecture will expose many of the problems inherent in the
Architectural Copyright Act. As one commentator has explained,
"Courts have experienced difficulty in determining whether particular
works of authorship are useful articles and in applying the [Copyright]
Act's separability and independence test to ascertain whether a useful
article contains any features that are copyrightable." 82 By analogy, de-
termining copyrightable features in functionality will be equally difficult.
2. Discrimination Against Architectural Styles
As with any separability test, the functionality test discriminates
against modem architecture.8 3 Indeed, as one commentator has stated,
the separability approach "to determin[e] the copyrightability of works
of applied art favors traditional art forms and denies protection to some
less conventional styles, such as modem abstract utilitarian design." 84
Even the Copyright Office has recognized the difficulties with this dis-
tinction, stating that
[t]he unexpressed notion appears to be that if a considerable portion of
the cost of the building has been for decoration, it may be considered a
work of art, whereas, if form has followed function, the building is not
a work of art. This is a dangerous notion and one which could plunge
us into the midst of a bitter artistic controversy.8 5
79. For example, decoration on a building is not functionally required and is physi-
cally separable. See also infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (discussing Gins-
burg's example of the Pompidou Center that also illustrates this point).
80. See H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6952.
81. See Shipley, supra note 12, at 419 ("[I]f a building is functional, there may be only
a few aspects of it that are protectible."). Applying the separability test to buildings
further evinces the similarity between the two tests. See, e.g., Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cas-
cade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) (if functional concerns influ-
ence the building's appearance, the sculptural features would be deemed inseparable);
Carol Barnhart Inc., 773 F.2d at 418 (if "artistic features of the [buildings] are insepara-
ble from the [buildings'] use as utilitarian articles the [buildings] are not copyrightable")
(emphasis added).
82. Shipley, supra note 12, at 422-23 (citing as examples Poe v. Missing Persons, 745
F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984); Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 594 F. Supp. 364
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985)).
83. See Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 6, at 25.
84. Shipley, supra note 12, at 442.
85. Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 91.
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One example of a style that would probably qualify for protection
under the Architectural Copyright Act of architecture is Robert A.M.
Stem's neo-shingle style. The houses he designed in Long Island, New
York, 6 incorporate turrets and other fanciful embellishments. Many of
these design elements are nonfunctional and would easily qualify as
copyrightable under the Act. On the other hand, the Lever House office
building in New York City is an example of a building style that would
not be protected. Since the entire building was influenced by functional
concerns-its overall shape was dictated by zoning laws and the need to
accommodate business machines; its glass skin was a new method of con-
struction; and its glass color was one of the few hues made to absorb
heat--it would not be copyrightable under the functionality test.
Today, more than ever, the use of a separability test will have a dis-
criminating effect on architecture. As one commentator has noted:
Much architecture today strives for a unity of function and design.
The useful aspects of the building and its underlying structural compo-
nents are often emphasized in a modem architectural work, if not uti-
lized as the main motif of its design. A strict application of
[separability] would deny copyright protection to the majority of con-
temporary architectural structures and result in a discrimination
against modem abstract architecture.8 8
Discriminating against certain styles of architecture is inconsistent
with established copyright principles. 9 The Architectural Copyright
Act should protect all artistic styles. Although Shipley does suggest that
certain styles of architecture may deserve less copyright protection than
others,90 many of the world's most valued and respected works of archi-
tecture are modem in style--such as the John Hancock Building in Bos-
ton91 and the TWA Terminal at Kennedy Airport in New York.9" It
seems senseless that these works should go unprotected while other
structures are protected because they incorporate more nonfunctional
embellishments. Put simply, to avoid discriminating against certain
styles of architecture, the functionality test needs to be re-interpreted or
86. See Leland M. Roth, A Concise History of American Architecture 349 (1979)
(describing these houses).
87. See Carol H. Krinsky, Gordon Bunshaft of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill 17-21(1988) (describing the Lever House).
88. White, supra note 38, at 71.
89. These principles state that "if a work might arguably be regarded as a work of art
by any meaningful segment of the population, be they high-brow, low-brow, hippy, avant-
garde, middle class-bourgeois, adult or juvenile, then the work must be considered a work
of art for copyright purposes." Nimmer, supra note 9, § 2.08[B][1], at 2-85; see also
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Justice Holmes ad-
monished courts not to weigh artistic merit to avoid discriminating against particular
styles); Shipley, supra note 12, at 442 (applying this warning to architecture).
90. See Shipley, supra note 12, at 427.
91. See Roth, supra note 86, at 335-36 (describing the Hancock Building).
92. See id at 295-297 (photograph and description of the TWA Terminal).
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
replaced.93
3. Distinguishing Between Function and Aesthetics
Even if discrimination between architectural styles could be resolved,
distinguishing between the functional and the aesthetic aspects of an ar-
chitectural work poses severe difficulties. This is due to the mutualism of
creative and practical concerns in a building.94
In fact, because architecture embodies both art and construction, its
"ambivalent nature" has always been a reason for its lack of copyright
protection." A few examples illustrate this point. It would be difficult,
for instance, to distinguish artistic features from functional features in
such modern buildings as the Wang Building in New York City or the
Johnson Wax Building in Racine, Wisconsin, by Frank Lloyd Wright.
The main decorative motif on the Wang Building's facade is its structural
cross-beams,96 while the interior of the Johnson Wax Building is famous
for its mushroom-like columns that hold up the roof.97
Shipley comments that courts should be able to distinguish between
the functional and the design features in a building as they have done in
the applied arts.98 Without guidelines, however, courts could struggle
for years to define architectural copyrightability as, in fact, they strug-
gled to define separability in utilitarian articles. 99
93. See infra notes 157-73 and accompanying text (proposing a revision of the func-
tionality test).
94. In a 1989 Report to Congress, the Copyright Office itself recognized this difficulty
when it stated, "[i]n the case of architecture particularly, it would often be difficult to
differentiate between the functional and the 'artistic' features of a design." Copyright
Report, supra note 2, at 93-94. Moreover, as early as 1961, the Register of Copyrights
"recommended against extending protection to the design of functional architectural
structures because of the difficulty in distinguishing between the functional and artistic
features of a design." Shipley, supra note 12, at 418, 437 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
95. See Michel Huet, Architecture and Copyright, 19 UNESCO Copyright Bull., No.
4, at 14, 15 (1985).
96. See Elliot Willensky & Norval White, AIA Guide to New York City 262 (3d ed.
1988) (describing the Wang Building).
97. For a description of the Johnson Wax Building, see Roth, supra note 86, at 255,
261-62.
98. See Shipley, supra note 12, at 439.
99. See Latman, supra note ?, at 197-224. The Second Circuit alone shows to what
extent courts can derive their own standards for separability. See, e.g., Brandir Int'l, Inc.
v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) (if the disputed design
element was dictated by functional considerations, then it is not copyrightable); Carol
Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[S]ince the
aesthetic and artistic features of the [mannequin] forms are inseparable from the forms'
use as utilitarian articles the forms are not copyrightable."); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accesso-
ries by Pearl, Inc. 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (belt buckle had aesthetic features
that were separable from the belt's function); Jane Ginsburg et al., Subject Matter of
Trademark Protection 157 (1991) (discussing these cases and other circuit court tests).
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a. When Functional Elements Should Be Protected
As indicated above, t ° the functionality test may not protect designs
and aesthetic judgments that are based on functional elements because
the Act excludes functionally determined designs from protection.' 0 ' In
addition, it is unclear to what extent function can play a role in a design
before that design is denied protection. Because the majority of elements
in a building are to some degree functionally determined 2---unless they
are applied decoration-the functionality test may deny protection to
many aspects of a building's design.
This result is ludicrous. Simply because some elements of architecture
are functional should not mean that the designs incorporating them are
not protectible.10 3 Recognizing the importance of incorporating function
into a building will more effectively protect architectural works. A court
that understands the role of function in architecture is less likely to deny
protection to deserving works.
The Copyright Office underestimates the influence of functional re-
quirements in a building's design. For example, it has stated, "The rela-
tive importance of function in architecture is vastly overemphasized,
perhaps as a result of unfamiliarity with the discipline. Very few archi-
tectural design elements are actually required by functional needs. There
are hundreds, if not thousands, of non-functional design options in many
architectural structures."'"
Although only a small portion of a building's design may reflect purely
functional needs, certainly much of its design is influenced by these con-
siderations. Moreover, many architects believe that function is a very
important element in their work. Le Corbusier, for instance, owes his
freedom of expression in his Dom-ino Houses to their underlying struc-
ture, a functional requirement.° 5 Similarly, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe,
in a speech to students, has stated that "We shall examine one by one
every function of a building and use it as a basis for form."'0 6 Finally,
many architects, such as Louis Sullivan, subscribe to and design by the
credo "form follows function."'1
0 7
Still other reasons exist in support of the idea that buildings should not
100. See supra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
101. See H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6952.
102. Windows and skylights are added to buildings to meet lighting and air require-
ments. The shape and size of a room are dictated by the client's demands as well as the
relationship of other rooms. In other words, almost every part of a building is influenced
by functional considerations.
103. See Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 209-10, 214; Shipley, supra note 12, at 439.
104. Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 211 (footnotes omitted).
105. Dom-ino Houses consist of columns supporting concrete slab floors that are com-
pletely independent of such other functions in the house as its partition walls. See Mau-
rice Besset, Le Corbusier: To Live with the Light 67-73 (1987). This structure allowed
Le Corbusier freedom to organize interior spaces as he wanted, to make the walls out of
any material, and to place windows without regard to walls. See id. at 67-71.
106. David Spaeth, Mies van der Rohe 114 (1985).
107. See H.W. Janson, History of Art 749 (3d ed. 1986).
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be denied protection under the Act simply because they incorporate
function into their designs.1 08 For instance, copyright protection is ac-
corded in other fields although functional concerns, by necessity, modify
an author's creative choices.I°9 Architectural plans are copyrightable,110
even though they reflect limitations imposed by such functional consider-
ations as building codes and client needs. Similarly, computer programs
are functional, yet courts have consistently held that they are copyright-
able as literary works.1 '
The copyrightability of architectural works is analogous to the
copyrightability of other products. Regarding musical works, Shipley
recognized that
[b]y analogy, a musical composer's creative options are limited by the
thirteen tones, their octaves, and their variations. Other constraints
are imposed by the limitations on a performer's range and on our abil-
ity to hear. Although the average composer of popular music works
under these physical limitations, the copyrightability of musical works
is not questioned.' 12
By comparison, an architect's "creative options" are limited by struc-
tural requirements, building codes, and technology, and should be
protected. 113
Even the Copyright Office has recognized that, while the difficult ques-
tion is in determining what constitutes a protectible architectural struc-
ture, this problem is simply a variation of the" 'familiar and troublesome
question of what constitutes a "work of art" in other areas of three-di-
mensional objects that may be utilitarian or aesthetic or both in combina-
tion.' "'14 Under existing law, abstract works of art-such as those by
Ellsworth Kelly-can be copyrighted. Some of Kelly's sculptures are
108. For example, foreign laws on architectural copyright grant protection to designs
incorporating functional elements. See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing foreign law protection for designs incorporating functional elements). Indeed, as
the Copyright Report has noted with regard to foreign copyright laws, "the fact that a
building embodying an architectural work has utilitarian or technologically dictated
characteristics does not, in and of itself, deprive the work of a potentially protectible
artistic character or aspect." Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 163. Nevertheless,
"many [foreign] statutes expressly exclude from copyright protection functional or engi-
neering or utilitarian aspects that exist in architectural works." Id.
109. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (lamp base copyrightable
although modified to allow for wiring); Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,
632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980) (belt buckle copyrightable).
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988); Shipley, supra note 12, at 399.
111. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-49
(3d Cir. 1983); see also Ginsburg, supra note 9, at 491 (noting that the functionality
limitation on protecting architectural works is similar to distinguishing a computer pro-
gram code that is required to accomplish a task from a code that is merely one of several
ways to achieve the program's purpose).
112. Shipley, supra note 12, at 399 (footnotes omitted).
113. See id.
114. Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 89 (quoting William S. Strauss, Copyright
Office Study No. 27, Copyright in Architectural Works (1959), in Senate Committee
Print, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966 Copyright Law Revision Study at 67).
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simple geometric forms made of one inch thick aluminum." 5 Because
these pieces meet a minimal level of originality, they would be protected
under copyright laws.'1 6 Philip Johnson's Glass House in New Canaan,
Connecticut is an architectural equivalent to Kelly's abstracts. It is com-
posed of a rectangular plan with minimal partitions and glass panels for
exterior walls." 7 Thus, although Philip Johnson's house is very simple
in its form, it presented the idea of "house" in an entirely new way and,
like Kelly's work, should be protected.1 18
Furthermore, Shipley correctly suggests that "[i]n some respects func-
tional architectural works are analogous to factual literary works.","19
Just as major portions of these writings contain factual data, there exist
"functional" or nonprotectible parts of a building-such as, structural
processes or borrowings from common sources.' t° Yet, illogically, the
factual work is accorded copyright protection and the functional building
is not.
Finally, subject matter much less deserving of protection than build-
ings can be copyrighted. Compilations' 2 1 such as the yellow pages, for
instance, are copyrightable.'1 As one commentator has noted on this
point, "Virtually any distinguishable variation created by an author in an
otherwise unoriginal work of art will constitute sufficient originality to
support a copyright. Therefore, a very modest quantum of originality
will suffice."' 23 Moreover, as Nimmer points out, simple butterfly and
vegetable designs have been held protectible, as well as a statuette of a
dog in the show position.'2 4 Without question, many buildings are more
deserving of copyright protection than these examples.
b. Limitations on Methods and Processes
Although architectural copyright should include many functional ele-
ments, protection should not be limitless. Copyright history in the
United States, in all areas, indicates that protection does not extend to
115. See Janson, supra note 107, at 745 (describing and providing a photograph of
Kelly's work).
116. See Neil F. Siegel, The Resale Royalty Provisions of the Visual Rights Act: Their
History and Theory, 93 Dick. L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (1988).
117. See Roth, supra note 86, at 306, 319-21 (describing and providing photographs of
the Glass House).
118. But see Magic Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Servs., 634 F. Supp. 769, 772 (,V.D. Pa.
1986) (denying protection to envelope with a black line marked on it and "Priority
Message" written on it).
119. Shipley, supra note 12, at 447.
120. See id.
121. A compilation is a collection of facts arranged in a particular way such that it
becomes an original work. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
122. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1988); Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publish-
ing Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Shipley, supra note 12, at 428
(architectural works are as worthy of protection as compilations).
123. Nimmer, supra note 9, § 2.08[B], at 2-87.
124. See id
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new ideas, but only to the expressions of these ideas.125 Therefore, con-
sistent with this history, new methods of construction or building
processes should not be protected under the Architectural Copyright
Act. In fact, prior to the Act's passage, the Copyright Office also
reached this conclusion, stating that the "exclusive rights of a copyright
owner in an architectural work shall apply only to the artistic character
and artistic design of the work, and shall not extend to processes or
methods of construction." 12
6
This limitation on construction processes and methods coincides with
the standards of other countries for determining the copyrightability of
architectural works. For instance, the WIPO/UNESCO committee set-
tled on an originality standard but limited it to matters of appearance
and form, stating that "originality in technical aspects (statics, resistance
of materials, etc.) are irrelevant and even their noted absence does not
exclude copyright protection. New materials, new methods of construc-
tion and other technological novelties are not protected by copyright." '127
Similarly, copyright protection in India and France does not extend to
processes or methods.'28 The Copyright Office, after conducting a study
of foreign laws on architectural copyright, concluded that similar limita-
tions should be imposed on an American architectural copyright act.'29
The problem presented by the Architectural Copyright Act is simply
where to draw the line between protected aesthetic forms that incorpo-
rate functional elements, on the one hand, and, on the other, unprotected
processes and methods of construction in an architectural work that
merges form and function. While the Act seeks to protect the creativity
involved in architecture, rather than the architectural elements them-
selves, a standard is needed to recognize this creativity and clarify the
difference between the design itself and elements used in the design.
125. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879); see also Wickham v. Knoxville Int'l Energy Exposition,
Inc., 555 F. Supp. 154, 155 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) ("mechanical or utilitarian aspects of
works are not protected by copyright").
126. Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 113.
127. World Intellectual Property Org., Works of Architecture: Preparatory Document
for and Report of the WIPO/UNESCO Committee of Governmental Experts, 22 Copy-
right 403, 406 (1986). It is a different situation, however, when these new processes are
used to help the architect create new forms that may qualify for copyright protection.
See id.; see also Krinsky, supra note 87, at 24 (architects use modem technology in their
designs).
128. See Wargo, supra note 9, at 420-21.
129. See Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 119, 163 ("[D]esign features of buildings
responsive primarily to engineering, structural, or other functional considerations would
generally not be protected."). It is unclear, however, how foreign courts determine the
scope of protection of a structure. See Adolf Dietz, Letter from the Federal Republic of
Germany: The Development of Copyright Between 1979 and the Beginning of 1984, 20
Copyright 426, 431 (1984) (noting that the German court denied copyright protection for
hostels but granted it for a swimming pool enclosure).
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B. Alternative Standards to Determine Architectural Copyrightability
Having identified the flaws inherent in the "functionality" standard, it
is necessary to conceive an alternate methodology for determining the
copyrightability of architectural works.
1. Other Proposed Standards
Some commentators have suggested what elements of an architectural
work are copyrightable and have proposed their own tests to distinguish
the copyrightable aspects of a building from the nonprotectible aspects.
a. Dual Functions
The Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation has suggested that the test of
conceptual separability should turn on whether "the ordinary observer
understands the work as having a conceptually dual function-that of a
work of art and that of a useful article." 3 ' This dual function test, how-
ever, disfavors modem and novel works of architecture because an ordi-
nary observer may not regard modem architecture as art. This would
lead to the realization of the fear expressed by Justice Holmes that triers
of fact would be making artistic judgments without proper knowledge
and expertise.13 1
Another conceptual separability test that has been proposed poses two
questions: (1) "Can an ordinary observer conceive the presence of artis-
tic features in [the] structure ... ?" and (2) "If so, are those features
dictated by the [structure's primary] function... ? If not, then the artis-
tic features are conceptually separable and thus protectible under this
theory."1 32 The first part of this test is inadequate for the same reasons
as the test proposed by the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation. It too is
subject to traditional prejudices against modem architecture, and it re-
quires courts to make unqualified artistic judgments. In addition, works
that meet the first part of this test may very well fail its second part when
"form follows function" in an architectural work, again discriminating
against modem architecture.
b. Artistic Architectural Structures
Commenting in a Copyright Office Report to Congress, William
Strauss sought to protect architectural works that were also works of art,
offering "broad delineations" to determine what is an "artistic architec-
tural structure." 133 Strauss recognized that a monumental structure
meant to be appreciated for its aesthetic form should qualify for protec-
130. Comments of the Frank Lloyd Wright Foundation to U.S. Copyright Office No-
tice of Inquiry on Architectural Work Protections 21, in Copyright Report, supra note 2,
app. C.
131. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
132. Copyright Report, supra note 2, at xx.
133. Strauss, in Senate Committee Print, supra note 114, at 77.
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tion. 134 On the other end of the spectrum, however, Strauss stated that
"[t]he ordinary structure designed for functional use (such as dwellings,
shops, office buildings, factories, etc.) though attractive of its kind, would
rarely, if ever, qualify as a 'work of art.' ,,135
Nevertheless, "[d]wellings, shops, office buildings, and factories are
more and more conceived of and executed as works of art and too often
churches, museums, and auditoriums are erected which are without ar-
tistic value." '136 Although Strauss may have sought to exclude functional
structures lacking in artistic merit, his test clearly provides inadequate
protection to many architectural works. Some of the most innovative
architectural works include private residences, retail boutiques, and office
buildings. Specific examples of buildings unprotected under Strauss's
test, yet famous for their designs and deserving of copyright protection,
include the AT&T Building137 and the Citicorp Building, 13 both in New
York City, and houses designed by Frank Gehry in California.' 39
Strauss did recognize that most architecture falls somewhere between
the two extremes of unprotectible ordinary structures and protectible ar-
tistic statements. His only suggestion, however, was to have a relatively
shorter term of protection for these works, similar to "ornamental de-
signs for useful articles."'" This solution is untenable. Not only did
Strauss fail to offer any reason for this distinction, but also-as a matter
of principle-some architectural works should not receive lesser copy-
right protection than other works, nor should architecture be treated dif-
134. See id., in Senate Committee Print, supra note 114, at 77.
135. Id., in Senate Committee Print, supra note 114, at 77. At the time Strauss submit-
ted his study, there were numerous well-designed buildings that he would consider un-
protectible. For example, Albert Kahn had designed auto factories that had received
recognition from the architectural press. See Gretchen G. Bank, From High Rise to Low-
E, Architectural Rec., July 1991, at 144, 146.
136. Joshua Cahn, Comments and Views Submitted to the Copyright Office on Copy-
right in Architectural Works (1959), in Senate Committee Print, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1966 Copyright Law Revision Study 86 (made in response to the study submitted by
Strauss).
137. The AT&T Building is best known for its Chippendale style roofline and was
named one of the best corporate headquarters in the United States. See Best Corporate
Headquarters Built in the 1980's, USA Today, Nov. 28, 1989, at 6A (describing the build-
ing and including a photograph).
138. The Citicorp's angled roof and sleek tower shaft has become a significant part of
Manhattan's skyline. See Paul Goldberger, Best Views of the New City of Lights, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 4, 1983, at Cl (describing the building); Andrea E. Monfried, Technics:
High Profiles, Progressive Architecture, Feb. 1990, at 49 (same). The Citicorp Building
received numerous awards including the American Institute of Architects Honor Award
for Achievement of Excellence in Architectural Design in 1979 and the New York City
Chapter AIA Award for Outstanding Contribution to Life in New York City in 1978.
Telephone Interview with Deborah Mahoney, Director of Marketing of Stubbins Associ-
ates, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 4, 1992).
139. The Schnabel Residence and the Winton Residence Guest House both received
National American Institute of Architects Honor Awards (1990 and 1988, respectively).
See Honor Awards, Architecture, Mar. 1990, at 96 (Schnabel Residence); John Pastier,
Assemblage of Disparate Objects, Architecture, May 1988, at 166-69 (Winton Residence).
140. Strauss, in Senate Committee Print, supra note 114, at 77.
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ferently than other fields granted copyright protection. Other fields of
artistic endeavor do not grant more or less protection to works depend-
ing on their artistic merit.'41 This, in fact, is what Congress specifically
and copyright protection generally have sought to prevent. 42
c. Compelled by Use
Ginsburg proposes that conceptual separability 43 could be applied to
architecture and still allow broad protection. 44 She states:
Assume that the courts developed a rule that a design feature is con-
ceptually separable if its appearance was not compelled by the useful
purpose of the building. In that case, even useful elements in the de-
sign might be protected, so long as the arrangement of the useful ele-
ments proved arbitrary. 14 5
Ginsburg uses the Pompidou Center as an example of when functional
elements can be protected."4 Although the steam pipes are essential to
the building's function, their placement on the exterior facades is not. 14
Thus, because the functional elements are incorporated into a design and
their placement is not dictated by any function, the entire design is pro-
tectible even though it includes functional elements.
Determining when a building's use compels a design rather than
merely influences it is analogous to applying the "merger doctrine" to
utilitarian articles. The merger doctrine states that if there are limited
ways of expressing an idea, then the expression and idea merge together
and both are noncopyrightable.' 48 Although Ginsburg's proposal is use-
ful to help judges determine what is copyrightable in a structure, a
clearer standard is still needed to ensure uniformity.
d. Architectural Expression
Prior to the enactment of the Architectural Copyright Act, Shipley
suggested that architecture could be protected under the separability test
by interpreting the 1976 Copyright Act to protect the architect's original
expressions, and by taking an expansive approach in determining what is
141. Copyright in "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural" works does not give more or less
protection to a work depending on its artistic merit. See Nimmer, supra note 9,
§ 2.01[B], at 2-13 to 2-16.
142. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); H.R.
735, supra note 4, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6952.
143. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (defining conceptual separability).
144. See Ginsburg & Kernochan, supra note 6, at 24-26.
145. Id. at 26 (emphasis in original).
146. See iL
147. See id
148. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (discussing the "merger doctrine"
in further detail). The merger doctrine was developed in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,
103 (1879) and Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
Cir. 1971).
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copyrightable.149 As Shipley stated, "[P]rotect[ed] design features
should include, among other things, the specific configuration of rooms
and their dimensions, the arrangement of spaces and shapes, the location
of doors and windows, and some of the choices of materials."150 Shipley
also gave a specific list of examples of nonprotectible items, including
ideas, processes and methods of construction, general design concepts,
"the use of elements like skylights, atriums, courtyards, domes, columns,
and basic shapes" that cannot be monopolized.151
Although Shipley's lists are helpful, they are not all-inclusive, and thus
are ineffective substitutes for specific guidelines informing architects on
what they can expect to receive protection. Despite Shipley's examples, a
court faced with copyright questions involving features outside his list
may still be at a loss in determining copyrightability.
Furthermore, some of Shipley's examples of protected design features
should not be protected in certain contexts and some of his unprotected
design features should be protected. For example, many common mate-
rial choices should not be protected, while basic shapes arranged together
may very well qualify for protection. Thus, I.M. Pei's use of a pyramidal
skylight at the Louvre should be copyrightable because of his unique ex-
pression of an entrance, 152 while room configurations and dimensions-
protected under Shipley's formulation-often follow traditional stan-
dards and should not be protected.
15 3
Shipley's best illustration of what is copyrightable in a structure is his
example of a "design competition."' 54 Although the competition has
strict rules-for example, materials, cost, space, and program require-
ments-architects will present different solutions and these differences
are what is protectible. If all architects in a competition design one as-
pect of the building in the same manner, then it is unlikely that many
alternate means of expression exist, and such aspects of the building
should not be protected by copyright.155 Moreover, even if these similar-
ities are found to be copyrightable, they were prepared independently
without copying and therefore do not infringe on another's copyright. 1
6
Like Ginsburg's proposal, Shipley's example of the design competition
is analogous to applying the merger doctrine to architectural structures.
In this respect, his illustration is useful for courts to determine architec-
149. See Shipley, supra note 12, at 435, 442.
150. Id. at 431.
151. Id. at 439, 445.
152. See Paul Goldberger, In Paris, A Love Affair Between New and Old, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 2, 1989, at B1 (providing a description and photograph of the building).
153. For example, the proportion of a room may be based on a double cube.
154. See Shipley, supra note 12, at 430. In a design competition, architects are invited
to submit their proposals for a project, all following the same rules. See id.
155. See Ga-On Homes, Inc. v. Spitzer Homes, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183, 185
(M.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 685 (5th Cir. 1974) (although most homes
include the same rooms, their particular arrangement should be protected).
156. See Shipley, supra note 12, at 430.
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tural copyrightability. If courts recognize that the tests proposed by
Shipley and Ginsburg reflect an application of a traditional copyright
principle-namely, the merger doctrine-courts will be better able to de-
termine architectural copyrightability.
2. A Proposed Standard to Replace Functionality
Because of the concerns related to architecture in specific and to copy-
right in general, the appropriate test to apply in determining what is
copyrightable in architecture is a modified form of the separability test.
This test consists of three parts: (1) is there a minimal level of creativity
in the architectural work; (2) is the work based on implementing a pro-
cess or method; and (3) if it is a process or method, are there still alterna-
tive means of expression such that the work is copyrightable?
a. Is there a Minimal Level of Creativity?
The first step in determining whether a building design is copyright-
able is to determine if the building's design elements are original or, spe-
cifically, to decide whether there exists some minimal level of creativity
in the structure's design. This is the test used for all other areas of copy-
right. 157 In fact, the legislative history on this point clearly states that,
"[flirst, an architectural work should be examined to determine whether
there are original design elements present, including overall shape and
interior architecture."' 58
A standard of originality requiring only a minimal level of creativity
avoids the problems that are inherent in courts deciding on the artistic
merits of architecture.1 "9 This is a particularly desirable result because,
in general, society has a limited view of what works of architecture are
also works of art."6° In addition, as numerous scholars have realized,
more commonplace structures do have some artistic elements, and archi-
tecture generally should be considered "artistic." As one judge has
stated:
I don't think you could build a house, in [sic] a modern home in
America, without having a kitchen and a bedroom and a family
room.... But the peculiar arrangement of them sometimes results in a
design concept which, when all put together, is an appealing, saleable
product. That is the concept that can be copyrighted and was
157. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1287 (1991);
Nimmer, supra note 9, § 2.01[B], at 2-11 to 2-16.
158. H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 20, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6951.
159. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903); supra
notes 141-42 and accompanying text (discussing the general copyright principle that
copyright protection should not depend on artistic merit).
160. See Copyright Report, supra note 2, at 88. The addition to the Louvre by I.M.
Pei, for instance, was detested by many people when it was in the design stage. See
Goldberger, supra note 152, at BI.
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copyrighted. 
16 1
Finally, to require more than originality-for example, to use a Ninth
Circuit test stating that "[a] thing is a work of art if it appears to be
within the historical and ordinary conception of the term art"' 62-- only
"transfer[s] aesthetic judgments to a different jury," and results in subjec-
tive determinations of what is art.' 63 As indicated numerous times in
this Note,' 64 such subjective determinations should be avoided.
b. Is It a Process or Method?
If an architectural work is found to be original, the next question
should be whether the protection being sought consists of a method or
process of construction. This is an important determination because of
Congress's stipulation that methods and processes are excluded from
copyright protection. 65 If the answer is no, then the work should be
copyrightable. Because the first step determines whether there are origi-
nal "design" elements present, if no method or process is involved, there
are simply no barriers to protection.1
66
c. Are There Alternative Means of Expression?
If the work is found to be a method or process of construction under
step two then, as a third step, one must determine whether its placement
is purely functional or whether it contributes to the building's aesthetic
design.' 67 If placement serves a purely functional purpose, protection
should be withheld. In contrast, if reasonable alternative methods of in-
corporation are available, copyright protection should exist.
The problems that arise under this prong are not whether specific
functional elements of a building are protectible. Instead, the focus is on
whether certain types of buildings are precluded from protection because
of their functional elements. In other words, a designer would not seek
protection for one useful aspect of his structure under the Architectural
Copyright Act, as the Act is meant to protect the "design of a building"
and not an object.168 Even further, "individual standard features" are
specifically excluded from the Act. ' 69 Thus, this step is meant to exclude
161. Ga-On Homes, Inc. v. Spitzer Homes, Inc., 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183, 185 (M.D.
Fla. 1973), aff'd, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 685 (5th Cir. 1974).
162. Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1953)
163. Denicola, supra note 32, at 714-15.
164. See supra notes 76, 88-89, 131 and accompanying text.
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
166. For example, facade arrangements generally do not include methods or processes.
Thus, if the design of these facade arrangements is found to be original, they should be
protected.
167. See supra note 111 (although computer codes consist of some functional require-
ments, they are still copyrightable).
168. See H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 18, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6949.
169. See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650,
§ 702(a), 104 Stat. 5133, 5133 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. 11 1990)).
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structures that are completely dictated by function-such as assembly
plants- from the protection provided by the Act.
Determining whether an architectural work is purely functional and
devoid of protection is analogous to determining what are the utilitarian
aspects of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural" articles. For example, if a
building's sequence of rooms is the most efficient layout for the function
of the building, and if that functionality is not consciously attributed to
the architect's design, the plan should not be protected. Similarly, if
there are only a few ways in which to express a certain structure, such as
a lighthouse, again the designer could not receive protection.
This analysis is analogous to portions of Shipley's test 7 ° and to the
Supreme Court's "merger doctrine" which states that, if there are limited
ways of expressing an idea, then the expression and idea merge together
and both are noncopyrightable.17 ' Thus, while a building element may
be deemed to be functional, the way in which it is incorporated into the
design of the building may still be copyrightable. Ginsburg's example of
the Pompidou's steam pipes on its facade is a perfect example of such a
scenario.'" 2 Although the pipes are a functional requirement of the
building, their placement is dictated by aesthetic rather than functional
or budgetary concerns. The facade, therefore, is still protectible because
of the original way in which the pipes are placed. In contrast, if the pipes
could only be placed on the exterior of this type of building, then their
expression and idea would "merge" and the placement of the pipes
would not be protected.
When both protectible nonfunctionally-determined elements and non-
protectible functional elements exist in an architectural work, copyright
protection should still be granted. Granting protection would not only
give architects the recognition they deserve as artists, but also would be
consistent with the Act's legislative history. The history suggests that
the Copyright Office would issue a certificate of registration to designers
in these cases, 7 ' and leaves it up to the courts to decide the scope of
protection on an ad hoc basis."14
Overall, this analysis will allow an architect to determine in advance
whether she can copy another's work. In addition, when the architect is
in doubt, she will seek out alternatives, thereby enriching the architec-
tural environment and answering her own question as to whether the
former architect's work is the only way to express the idea.
CONCLUSION
The Architectural Copyright Act and its legislative history provide
170. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text (describing a design competition).
171. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
172. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
173. See H.R. 735, supra note 4, at 21, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6952.
174. See ia
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minimal guidance in determining what aspects of an architectural work
are protectible. They are also unclear as to how to treat works that can-
not be categorized solely as architecture or art or nonhabitable three-
dimensional structures. What is clear, however, is that the legislative
history attempts to limit copyright protection to only a few structures by
using a functionality test. In contrast, this Note suggests that architec-
ture should be given expansive copyright protection.
Because there is no guidance for the Copyright Office to determine
protection for architectural works under the new Act, additional stan-
dards for granting protection must be developed. Thus, the term "build-
ing" under the Architectural Copyright Act should be defined as broadly
as possible to ensure that all deserving architectural works are protected.
In addition, sculptural architectural works should receive dual protec-
tion under the categories of both sculpture and architecture. Finally, to
determine the copyrightability of architectural works, a three-step stan-
dard should be applied. First, the work must be "original." Second, if
the work is not a method or process, it should receive protection. Lastly,
if the work is a method or process, a court must determine whether the
placement of the disputed feature is one of only several possible manners
of expression. If it is, then it should not be copyrightable. But, if there
are a number of alternate ways of placing this feature, then it should be
copyrightable. Only by adopting such new standards can the modern
law of copyright in architecture truly meet the dual goals of both protect-
ing designs and encouraging creativity.
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